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Political investors: Political elite oligarchy and mastery of regional resources in Indonesia

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Abstract

The political investors in the regional head election in Indonesia are an interesting phenomenon to be studied, as not all candidates for regional head, whether governors, regents, or mayors, have the capital to financially support their candidacy. Meanwhile, the nomination fee from has been increasing. For instance, in one of the regencies in Indonesia, the cost has reached 30 billion rupiah. This provides opportunities for regional head candidates to be financed by other people or business groups, known as political investors. This research was conducted to determine the extended role of political investors in regional head elections. This descriptive qualitative research collected data through in-depth interviews and observations as well as online and paper documents. The results showed that political investors play an essential role in enabling regional head candidates to win, and that they in turn benefited from the elections.

Keywords

political economy, political investors, political oligarchy, rational choice theory

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Introduction

After 2000, the condition of global democracy was considered to have stagnated, if not declined. Contrarily, Diamond (2009) stated that this phenomenon had not occurred in Indonesia as it is one of the most stable democracies in Southeast Asia. Fealy (2011) reported that Indonesia is the largest Muslim democracy in the world, thus Islamic and nationalist groups are absorbed into the mainstream of politics (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2019). The combination of Islamic values and democracy in Indonesia (Horowitz, 2010) has succeeded in bringing it, through the era of transition, from an authoritarian regime to civil democracy. This has become important for a Muslim country. On the other hand, the democracy in Indonesia has its own problems. While Indonesian democracy is developing positively, according to Davidson and Henley (2007), there is corruption in the corruption eradication institutions at the same time. According to Webber (2006), the democracy era in Indonesia showed that the political process is controlled by patrimonial groups. This was in line with Buehler and Tan (2007), who reported that party cartels dominated in the direct election era. Emmerson (2010), Han (2010), and Bubandt (2014), have stated that Indonesia became the most democratic country as well as the most corrupt country in Southeast Asia.

In regional post-reform head elections since 2004, people in the regions have the right to determine candidates for regional heads who can be trusted to regulate and manage their interests, and carry out the development in accordance with people's aspirations in that region, as happened in South Bengkulu Regency, Bengkulu Province. The assumption that to win a regional election, the candidates must be from a political party and prepare a great amount of money is not exactly true. The winner of this election was not the candidate with the highest capital, but the person who was closest to the communities and achieved their support. Even though the candidate, Dirwan Mahmud, was known to be a former prisoner, he was able to win the South Bengkulu regional election for the period of 2016–2021. He thanked community contributions for this (Wijaya, 2016).

However, the existence of candidates like Mahmud is very limited. Most candidates for advanced regional head in local elections cannot be separated from the involvement of people who have political power, networks, and money. Those people are called local election investors. The participation of investors in supporting candidates for regional head is carried out with various motives, the most dominant being political and economic. According to Fitriyah (2011), the cost of nominating regional heads which often cannot be fulfilled by candidates' personal finances makes candidates look for funding from outside parties, including the possibility of illegal funds. Therefore, regional head candidates often look for entrepreneurs to join the election as political investors. In return, entrepreneurs are promised many privileges (e.g. economic and political protections). Logically, those who owe for their election financial support will repay it by conducting certain services in various concessions to the parties who provided the support, and will ultimately marginalize the aspirations of the wider community. This situation provides the right conditions for increased corrupt behavior on the part of regional heads in order to repay their debts.

Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) researcher Dahlan (Irawan, et al. [2014]) revealed that there is no such thing as a free donation for elections. Promises are made by both parties, candidates and investors. Investors, in many cases, have a dominant role in controlling candidates. Businesspeople in the mining sector and in palm oil plantations flocked to give donations for regional elections in some regions. By providing the donations, they gained licenses to open extensive mining land in the future, as well as receiving protection since local residents were against their projects (Natalia, 2012).

Zuhro (Suara.com [2017]), a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Science (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia-LIPI), stated that in local elections, one of the crucial things is the funds flow for the prospective pairs. It has been found that the modus operandi of investors in elections is to position themselves behind the scenes. In this way, they can invest in each of the candidates. The trend is that the amount of funds will increase for the candidate who is predicted to win, and will be increasingly dynamic during the voting period until all stages of the election are declared over, when the funders clearly show their role. Political investors can determine the fate of a candidate. In addition, they make local elections expensive (Cahya, 2017).

Rumesten (2014) discussed the correlation between regional elections and corruption committed by elected regional heads after they take office. Redjo (2016) focused on elections from the point of view of the dynamics of democracy and political parties in Indonesia in recruiting candidates who will participate in the contestation. Suyatno (2016) examined local elections in terms of voter participation, which is a challenge of local democracy. This research was conducted to determine the extent of the role of political investors in regional head elections.

Literature review

Regional head elections are better known as direct elections. According to Pradhanawati (2005), a regional head election is a direct election for selecting regional leaders which involves the public in a sovereign manner. Regional head elections are also an activity of a democratic process that has an output (elected), not an elected official. According to Sasono (2008), 2004 was the graduation year of democracy for Indonesia. This can be clearly seen in the mandate of the Regional Autonomy Law, namely Law Number 32 of 2004, concerning regional government, regional heads, governors, regents/mayors, in which the provisions must be directly chosen, along with the holding of direct elections for president and vice president at national level. This law is a metamorphosis of previous laws (Sasono, 2008).

There are many reasons why direct regional elections are currently used. One of the needs in implementing regional autonomy is people's participation in developing their regions. According to Rauf (1995), the important goal of regional autonomy is to open more opportunities for local people to be involved in decision making regarding the development of their region, either directly or indirectly. This involvement has been represented by the people's representatives in the Regional House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD). This political practice produced a situation that tended to deny the role of the people and to make them political commodities in gaining support. It creates gaps in people's aspirations so as to produce dissatisfaction. This phenomenon was observed by various parties so that it reached an agreement to involve people directly as decision makers in recruiting regional heads. The process in realizing that direction is not an easy matter; the attraction between the desires of central government and interests based on the principle of democracy can be seen in the formulation of rules (Rauf, 1995).

In general, the term "investor" refers to the person or actor who is carrying out an investment activity or process. Investment is the commitment to a number of funds or other resources carried out with the aim of obtaining future profits or to improve the investors' welfare. It can be in the form of direct or indirect investment. Direct investment is the investment of real assets such as the purchase of productive assets, the establishment of factories, opening of mining/plantations, and so forth; indirect investment or portfolio investment is an investment in financial assets (Halim, 2005). According to Husnan (2001), there are several aspects that form the basis of a person's decision to invest, one of which is return. This is an investment profit rate that consists of the

expected return which is expected by investors in the future. Realized return is the actual return that is obtained by investors.

Investment can also be used to influence how existing capital is used, including bribery or employing family or friends. People who have capital will benefit from political decisions related to economic policy, such as major interventions that increase economic interests to seek rent (Krueger, 1974). According to Buchanan (2003), political actions are the result of individual choices. The theory of traditional economics states that choices made within certain limits are considered as coercion. Individual behavior often acts on behalf of political groups. Constitutionally democratic, people owe loyalty to the constitution rather than to the government. Constitutional political economy involves a comparative assessment of constitutional rules, both existing and ones which may be enacted in future (Mazza, 2011). Priyatmoko (2006), a researcher from Airlangga University, Surabaya, said that in addition to general investment, there was also political investment. There are many people who invest in politics, such as entrepreneurs. The minimum level is by becoming a political party administrator, entering the regional head candidates' exchange, or supporting political parties and regional head candidates.

It seems that political investment is defined as investment related to economics or business. By investing in politics, investors expect benefits which are not only political, but also economic. Investments, either political or economic, sometimes fail. Some investors will try again, and profit and loss become normal consequences. In other words, politics and the economy cannot be separated, even at the local scale. This research clearly reveals a direct economic and political relationship, through the provision of funds to prospective regional heads. After the regional head candidate given the funds wins, the funder obtains both economic and political benefits through political policies made by the regional head.

Methods

This study was designed using a case study model, as the aim was to examine real events related to investors' role in the regional head elections of Sumenep Regency, East Java, which occurred between 2010 and 2015. It also provides substantive evaluation results on the roles of political investors in the Sumenep regional election in East Java between 2010 and 2020. The data analysis method was descriptive qualitative. The research was conducted using observation and interview instruments to study investors, regional head candidates, winning teams, supporters, and other directly-involved people.

Results and discussion

There were several parties who became investors in the Sumenep Regency regional head elections between 2010 and 2020, including politician and businessman Busyro Karim-Soengkono Sidik, and Achmad Fauzi (Candidates for Deputy Regent of Sumenep for the period 2015-2020) who was the regent for the following period. The amount of funds paid by Sidik reached IDR12 billion. Arsyh, a similar of Busyro-Soengkono as well as Busyro-Fauzi, who was also secretary of Dewan Syuro PKB Sumenep, said that Said Abdullah (SA) was the main funder of the Busyro-Soengkono nominating process. She added that the nominal amount of the fund reached IDR10 billion:

Initially, Mr. SA has prepared IDR funds 9 billion, but finally tethered to IDR12. He calculated that there would be a second round of regional elections, and it was correct. The amount is for all regional

head election costs. Starting from witnesses and everything. If anyone says, the regional head election costs reach IDR 20 billion or IDR 30 billion, i don't believe.¹

There were three patterns of funding provided by investors in financing advanced candidates in regional head elections. First, funding for personal needs, operational activities, socialization to prospective voters, and meeting with leaders to introduce themselves, as well as blessing and support requests. One informant stated that the candidates were even paid by investors when they agreed to support each other and cooperate in the election: "Busyro Karim, the regent candidate, is certainly happy, because all costs are borne by political investors. And materially, almost no cost at all."²

Second, investors financed the operational needs of the network and the winning teams, witnesses' fees, and campaign materials. These funds were received by a formal team formed by the candidates and their representatives together with the party and bearer figures, and were reported fully to the General Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum-KPU) and Election Supervisory Agency (Badan Pengawas Pemilu-Bawaslu). The team and witness lists were also reported in detail to district, subdistrict, and polling stations (Tempat Pemungutan Suara; TPS) in villages. Hunain Santoso, chairperson of the Dewan Pengurus Cabang (DPC) of the PDI Perjuangan of Sumenep Regency for the period 2004–2014, stated: "If the operational funds are indeed clear, such as operational funds for the PKB and PDI parties, it is usually done outside the internal party. Indeed, [laughs] there is, but hidden."³

Third, investors financed the need for money politic executions or voter buying in the form of money or goods. These funds were given by investors to trusted people, to be conveyed to the trusted village head or to other figures at the village level. The latter then gave the money to the voters. This fact was explained by Hunain Santoso, who was also on the core team of the Sumenep Regent and Deputy Regent candidates for the period of 2010–2015 of Busyro-Soengkono:

From the information we received, there are two kinds of funding, an operational fund and a certain fund to go to the community. But at the level of implementation it is possible that, technically, it is enough to directly give it to the village head not to directly reach the community. Yeah, it's enough to give it to the village head. Many of them are, indeed, the winners in the regional head elections who play with the village head, even though, technically, the people may complain because there are no funds.⁴

Agus, one of the people who helped SA in the two regional elections, said that each candidate must approach the village head:

I was asked to invite friends of the village head in Lenteng District to Mr SA's cattle farm in Pangarangan area. I was asked to speak, and after that Mr SA spoke and gave money to the village heads, as much as IDR10 million for each village head from 20 villages. The next team did the same thing, instead the money was sown. The information was IDR1.5 to 2 billion on the due day in Lenteng District. Mr SA told me only the first got 500, and 10 of them got about 700. This is the difference between Mr Zainal and Mr SA. Mr SA trusts who he gives the money to. He said that he believed in me; I am expecting to move forward.⁵

Taufik, Juluk Village Head of Saronggi Subdistrict, Sumenep Regency, East Java who helped Busyro-Fauzi, admitted that funds were the determining factor of the victory at the village level.

According to him, the community has been increasingly pragmatic in relation to certain elections, whether presidential or regional. Thus, in order to win, candidates must give money to prospective voters even though they are supported by the village head. SA assigned some close people, which is a party outside the formal team that communicates between them regarding giving money to prospective voters:

At the time of the regional head election, the money given to the voters was only IDR 20,000. However, in order for the money to be effective, one must pay attention to who gave the money to the voters. To be effective, the village head usually ordered the village government apparatus who gave the money to the voters "It's proven, in the village only won up to 75%".⁶

Funds provided by political investors ranged from IDR10 to 12 billion. This was widely used by regional head candidates and their deputies to establish communication with leaders and prospective voters (4 to 5 billion), and to build, foster, and maintain a winning network from the district level to the polling stations. This includes volunteer training. In addition, IDR1–2 billion was used to buy votes and money politic. The amount of money politic is relatively small in the case of the Sumenep election, compared to other regions, for several reasons. First, voters in Sumenep Regency considered the village head as the reference in choosing candidates. Although not as big as the other two districts in Madura, Sampang and Bangkalan, in Sumenep Regency voters still considered how the village head behaves during the regional head election. This was conveyed by DW, one of the officials in the Sumenep Regency government who was also on the winning team for regional head candidates in the 2010 election. According to him, around 60% or more of the voters in Sumenep Regency were dependent on the village head. This could be seen from the existence of the village head as the government who has the closest relationship and interaction with the community.⁷

Second, the respect for religious leaders. Not with standing that the voters' preferences in Sumenep Regency were increasingly independent, and the influence of religious leaders was less in determining and directing voters at the grassroots level on political contestation, both *pilkades* (pemilihan kepala desa; village head election), *pilkada* (pemilihan kepala daerah; regents election) as well as presidential elections; but still, all candidates who went to the regional head election in Sumenep Regency approached religious leaders. At the time, the socialization to the community, prospective regents, vice-regent candidates continued to meet religious leaders. Voters of the Sumenep Regency in the regional head election were still related to religious figures, religious leaders. This can be seen from the attitude of the prospective regional heads who approached and embraced the religious leaders. According to Rasul, even though Busro Karim was a religious figure or religious leaders, he still must be able to convince other religious leaders to have a willing to support his candidacy. Sitrul Arsyh explained that at the beginning of the nomination, they approached and convinced the religious leaders as well as asked for their blessing.

The third is the accepting of money politic. Voters' preferences in Sumenep Regency despite having a religious background were increasingly independent in making choices. Voters in Sumenep Regency could no longer be easily agitated with religious dogma. At the same time, they had a permissive tendency toward money politics. In several districts, such as Guluk-guluk, Lenteng, Bluto, and Saronggi, it was found that there was use of money politic from each candidate's winning team to win votes, with various nominal rates, from IDR7500 to 20,000 per vote. In the 2010 Sumenep District head election, the money politic given by the pair of candidates for regent and deputy regent candidates or his team was smaller than in the 2015 election. The amount given

Table 1. The funding provided by political investors and its use by prospective regional heads.

Pattern	Receiver	Amount (IDR)
Financing candidates' personal needs, operations, and communication to leaders and prospective voters.	Accepted by people who are close to the investors and given directly to the candidates.	4 billion
Funding all network operational needs and winning teams to pay witnesses as well as attribute requirements.	Accepted by an official team formed by bearer parties and supporting volunteers registered from the district level to the TPS.	4 billion
Financing the need for execution of money politic both in the form of money and goods.	Given to the people who are trusted, to be submitted to the village head or other figure at the village level who was trusted to carry it out.	1 to 2 billion per district

Source: Processed from the results of the interviews conducted with informants in 2019.

to the voters was only around IDR5000 for each vote. If one house had three people who could vote, then IDR15,000 was given. When they ran out of money, cigarettes worth IDR5000 were given. The pragmatic attitude of voters toward money in Sumenep Regency was also explained by Wima Edy Nugroho, the Director of the Proximity Survey Institute, which conducted a number of surveys during the regional head elections in Sumenep Regency between 2010 and 2015. Although the number was the lowest in Madura region, the voters in Sumenep Regency remain pragmatic in political choices, especially in money politics. This is in line with the opinion of Hasan Ubaid, the Director of Terukur, which conducted several surveys in the regional head elections of Sumenep Regency both in 2010 and 2015. In the survey, it was found that there were many voters who thought and behaved pragmatically in the regional elections both in 2010 and 2015.⁸

Political investors, who invested up to IDR10 billion, received many benefits. First were economic benefits. This can be seen from the placement of people close to them into positions in Regional Owned Enterprises (Badan Usaha Milik Daerah; BUMD). One such BUMD is PT Wira Usaha Sumekar (WUS), a business entity that deals with the participating interest (PI) of oil and gas companies. After the supported candidate for the regent won, the position of managing director of PT WUS went to Sitrul Arsyh, who has close relations with the elected regent, and the treasurer position went to Taufadi, who was close to SA. Sitrul was later replaced by Reza. In addition, Faruk, a former SA aide, was also appointed as one of the directors. Sitrul then created a subsidiary in Jakarta with Fauzi as treasurer and became Deputy Regent of Sumenep for the period 2015–2020. The economic benefits obtained were mentioned by Faruk: "But it's not a secret that a director in BUMDs like Sitrul needs Taufadi, a close person to all bosses. With the Sitrul case, all parties were called including me."⁹

Second are political economic benefits. Political economic benefits were gained by placing sanctioned officials in positions within the government at the level of head of department, section head, sub-district head, and others. In this way, the investors have a strong influence on the bureaucratic network, while also facilitating the access of trustees to certain positions and projects. This can be seen in the explanation by Rasul Junaidy, who was close to SA: "I used to say and asked for help to tell Buya, this is Rasul because this helps Buya first where is that, if the seems straight away, there is also the sub-district head"¹⁰

Table 2. Political investors' benefits after regional head election.

Form	Operation pattern	Benefit
Affiliation	Looking for coalition partners who have a high chance of winning, and placing party cadres in the position of deputy candidate regent.	Strengthen the position of the party in the government. Facilitate access to religion-based voters.
Economic	Place trusted people in positions in BUMD.	Facilitate access to obtain and manage economic benefits.
Political economic	Place authorized officials in positions within the government at the level of office heads, section heads, sub-district heads, or others.	Facilitate access for the trustees who obtained the positions and projects.

Source: Interviews with the informants, 2019

Third are affiliation benefits. The affiliation benefits are when investors establish coalitions and cooperation with parties that have similar nationality platforms, e.g. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB). Political investors benefit, in the form of coalition friends. Temen coalition which has a religious voter base that has been antipathy towards himself and his party (PDI Perjuangan):

We are in coalition with PKB, especially in Sumenep, in the regent elections because of one thing, there are similarities, similar steps. On the other hand, we are a nationalist party, so it was fit if our coalition is PKB, and it was proved successful for two periods. We have the common steps from our ancestors, the ancestors of the founders of the party both from PKB and PDI Perjuangan. From the past, it was indeed Bung Kamo with the clerics who had been knitted from the past between nationalists and religious people, that was our reference to hold a coalition with PKB.¹¹

Table 2 shows the network patterns and investor interactions with political power in the local level and resources, both human political resources, governmental bureaucracy and economic resources in the region. Investors build networks with political party managers and cadres those who were closely-related to the candidate. In the same time, investors also built communication with people who trusted the investors who were outsiders of the political parties management. In technical implementation, investors entrust people to communicate with candidates. Those people accompanied the candidates in carrying out activities during the election contestation process. In addition, the investors were mobilizing their own volunteer network and winners to conduct socialization to the voters. Formally, investors and formed teams from the district, sub-district, village and TPS levels. To execute the victory ahead the voting day, investors made the contact with local leaders and village heads, through the close people. Furthermore, the close people give "money" to local leaders and village heads. Local leaders at the village/ village level executed voters. The village head moved the village apparatus to execute the voters.

After the regional head candidate supported by political investors won the election and became the regional head, the regional head had access to the office head and to business directors.

The presence of investors in regional head elections is a kind of scourge for civil democracy that should be more sovereign, when voters in the region can freely determine the prospective leaders who will serve and regulate the development in the region. In accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the people in the area. This is what Jeffry Winters was worried about, the widespread fear of oligarchs and elites dominating and dominating a democracy which is going well (Bubandt,




Figure 1. Network patterns and investor interactions during the contestation process of regional head elections.

Source: Interview results conducted with informants in 2019.




Figure 2. Network and investor interaction with power and resources after election.

Source: Interview results conducted with informants in 2019.

2014). According to Winters (2013), oligarchic theory is able to uncover the political power that is behind the integration of political economy in Indonesia, which shows how big its role is in the country's journey. The oligarchy makes the power and the influence of individuals increasingly

color the political world, as the goal of the oligarchy, which dominates and deflects the political state. Hadiz (2007) said that people who have power at the local level were present in the era of regional elections as a local oligarchy. The oligarchy was created by the collaboration of political and business power. The election of regional heads is one of the entrances of the mingling between politicians and wealthy businessmen with the regional bureaucracy involved in controlling regional wealth. Sidel (2001) mentioned that strong people who have money at the local level show the control of economic resources by local elites in a region, even in the form of violence. In Indonesia, it strengthens and maintains its power by collaborating with political forces, both government and political parties, including bureaucratic officials. Then controlling natural resources, including penetrating the community and controlling politics in the region, even entering into the political process by regulating the winning of candidate pairs supported in the regions. Mietzner (2012) question if, in Indonesia, the phenomenon of cartel politics and oligarchy were increasingly wide spread.

The magnitude of political investors' role in elections in regions of Indonesia, one of which occurred in Sumenep Regency, East Java, shows that the role of money in local political contestation is very large. Regional heads who succeed in winning the regional head elections need large funds, and this can be obtained from political investors who have the ability to fund.

The presence of investors in regional head elections, which shows the face of political oligarchy and elite power, is a power matrix at the local level in order to gain authority, legitimacy, and power through electoral democracy as an opportunity to access resources (Wilson, 2015). The enormous role of political investors in regional head elections is seen as a condition that affects the political system in money-driven political systems. According to Ferguson (1995) political policy that was born was an arm of the interests of elites who had funds, the party only became an instrument of investors, so it is not surprising that many parties have a lot of money, even if they want to invest large amount of money to be contributed to political activities. These contributions are similar to investments that provide returns, in the form of political power and broad access to the public budget (Muhtadi, 2019). According to Mujani et al. (2019), in rational voter theory, people are seen as actors who always calculate the costs and benefits derived from actions taken. Thus, every action must be ensured to benefit the individuals themselves. In pursuit of profits, actors weigh up the costs incurred in any investment.

According to Coleman (1994), the rational choice theory is a rational act of an individual or actor to carry out an action based on a particular goal which is determined by values or choices (preferences). The orientation of the magnitude of rational choice has a basic idea that people act intentionally toward the goal which is shaped by values or choices. That goal moves their rational attitude and actions. Wirawan (2014) explained the interaction of actors with others in the social world as a series of trade negotiations or competitive games. The purpose of social participation is to increase the supply of social values through an interaction process. This involves exchanging valuable goods with the intention of gaining profits or being able to control, coerce, and/or exploit others. In many theories of rationality, the total cost of obtaining a total profit is kept at zero, i.e. a "zero-sum game." This means that self-profits automatically indicate the loss of others. Then it can be clearly understood that human behavior as an actor is done rationally, since it considers the benefits and disadvantages of that behavior.

Even politics on a local scale, such as regional elections, cannot be separated from the economic role that is driven by elites who have an interest in obtaining economic and political benefits. The region head chosen has no essential role in realizing people's sovereignty in services and

developments, but is preoccupied by the demands and bargaining of the political investors who have supported them.

Conclusion

The presence of political investors is a common phenomenon in regional head elections, partly caused by the large number of candidates who lack funds to finance the election contestation process. Direct local elections are not cheap, and it takes IDR10 to 12 billion for each district/city level. Investors have a role to regulate the process of winning candidates, starting from determining the bearer party record, mobilizing formal and non-formal winning networks, recruiting survey institutions, making contact with village leaders, and executing money politics and votes buying. Political investors enacted benefits from their support of regional head candidates, in terms of strengthening their political power and controlling resources, both human resources in the bureaucracy and economic resources through governmental programs and BUMDs, especially those engaged in oil and gas. Based on these research findings, it is expected that there will be further research which analyzes the involvement of political investors in local government, especially the support of political investors for regional head candidates. In addition, this will reveal the possibility of local shadow governments.

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Notes

1. Interview with Sitrul Arsyh, Secretary of Dewan Syuro DPC PKB Sumenep, in her house in Ganding, Sumenep Regency, May 1, 2019.
2. Interview with Faruk, former aide and driver of SA in Warung Gacoan, Pasuruan City, East Java, Friday, March 8, 2019.
3. Interview with Hunain Santoso, Chief of DPC PDIP 2004–2014, in his house, Kecamatan Ganding, Sumenep, April 5, 2019.
4. Interview with Hunain Santoso, Chief of DPC PDIP 2004–2014, in his house, Kecamatan Ganding, Sumenep, April 5, 2019.
5. Interview with Agus, former Camat, in his house, Kolor, Sumenep City, April 26, 2019.
6. Interview with Taufik, Head Village Juluk, Saronggi District, Sumenep Regency, in his office, April 29, 2019.
7. Interview with DW, former winning team member, in his house, Sumenep City, April, 26 2019.
8. Interview with Hasan Ubaid, Director of Terukur, consultants and pollsters, in Maxx Cafe, Matos Malang, March, 22, 2019.
9. Interview with Faruk, former aide and driver of SA, in Warung Gacoan, Pasuruan City, East Java, March 8, 2019.
10. Interview with Rasul Junaidy, close to SA, in Ayoka Cafe, Pajagalan, Sumenep City, March 17 2019.

11. Interview with Deky Purwanto, Chief of DPC PDI Perjuangan Sumenep Regency 2014–now, in his house, Kolor, Sumenep City, April 21, 2019.

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